United Nations A/C.4/55/SR.20

General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session

Official Records

Distr.: General
5 April 2001
English
Original: Spanish

Fourth Committee

Summary record of the 20th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 8 November 2000, at 4 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Kiwanuka ..... (Uganda)
later: Mr. Holkeri ..... (Finland)

Contents

Agenda item 86: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate corrigendum for each Committee.

00-73517 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 4.05 p.m.

Agenda item 86: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (A/54/670, A/54/839, A/55/138-S/2000/693, A/55/305-S/2000/809, A/55/507 and Add.1)

1. **Prince Al-Hussein** (Jordan), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that the Movement had always believed that peacekeeping operations must conform strictly to the guiding principles articulated previously in the final documents of both the eleventh Ministerial Conference of Cairo and the Durban Summit of 1998, as contained in paragraphs 51 to 56 of the report of the Special Committee (A/54/839). The establishment by the United Nations of any new peacekeeping operation or the extension of an existing mandate should not only be based on the consent of the parties, but also on the non-use of force, except in self-defence; impartiality; clearly defined mandates; and secure financing — all of which were essential to a mission's success.

2. The Movement continued to uphold the belief that United Nations peacekeeping operations were an important instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. However, such operations could not be a substitute for a permanent solution or for addressing the underlying causes of conflicts. In the past, peacekeeping operations had demonstrated their usefulness when, as a temporary measure, they had contributed to the maintenance of a ceasefire or a cessation of hostilities, which had not only lessened the possibility of a future escalation, but had also provided an atmosphere conducive to the pursuit, through other peaceful means, of an end to the conflict.

3. Concerning the report of the Special Committee and the oral presentation of the Under-Secretary-General on the Secretariat's implementation of the Special Committee's recommendations, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries believed that it was crucial for the success of all missions that prospective troop-contributing countries should be approached by the Secretariat at the earliest phases of mission planning, as underscored in paragraph 60 of the Special Committee's report, in order to consider their views and incorporate the most important of them in the Secretariat's planning.

4. The Security Council, too, should involve troop-contributing countries in its consultations from the earliest stages of planning an operation until the termination of such operation. Unless members of the Security Council, in particular the permanent members and those with obvious capabilities, decided themselves to meet the troop levels they mandated, particularly dangerous operations, unless they wanted to do it all themselves, then a deeper sense of mutual trust must be cultivated between those who designed operations and those who implemented them. It was a partnership that had been absent in the case of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and other missions before it. The Movement had been stressing for some time that whenever the use of force was contemplated, the Council should adhere to Articles 43 and 44 of the Charter of the United Nations.

5. Turning to the issue of misconduct to which paragraphs 65 and 66 of the Special Committee's report referred, and following the Movement's informal discussions with the Under-Secretary-General, the Movement welcomed the latter's recognition that, in the case of serious offences, there might well be a need for capitals to send a team to the mission area to facilitate the prosecution of the individual concerned following repatriation.

6. As far as recruitment was concerned, all posts must be filled in a manner consistent with the requirements of Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter of the United Nations, and on as wide a geographical basis as possible. The Secretariat must show greater transparency with regard to selection procedures, whether of individuals or countries, for peacekeeping duties. While it was obvious that some information, such as the identity of specific candidates, must remain confidential, the criteria used for selection in each case had to be understood by everyone. In the Movement's view, the use by the Secretariat of the expression "political sensitivities" to explain its selection or rejection of candidates, was too vague.

7. The Movement commended the Secretariat on the implementation of the improved procedures for selection of personnel for senior field appointments, which included interviews of candidates, as had happened in the case of a recent senior field appointment. The Movement hoped that in future all commanders, without exception, would undergo an interview. Moreover, it was stated in paragraph 73 of

the Special Committee's report that interviews should be conducted by staff with field experience.

8. With respect to the Secretary-General's Bulletin on the observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law (ST/SGB/1999/13), the Movement had explained during the previous year's debate why it had regretted the manner in which the Secretary-General had promulgated the guidelines. In paragraph 82 of the report, the Secretariat was asked to clarify the Bulletin's legal status, and the Movement hoped that the Secretariat would consult the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on the matter.

9. He requested further clarification of the sample rules of engagement, in light of the fact that they were used not only for training but also as the basis for mission-specific or operational rules of engagement and that the consultations with Member States that should have taken place had failed to materialize; in fact, many countries had yet to receive these rules.

10. The Movement took note of the intention to enhance the Lessons Learned Unit, giving it greater relevance to policy and operational considerations. However, the Unit should be provided with more secure funding and the Special Committee should be informed of what had been learned and consulted on what would be put into practice.

11. With respect to reimbursement, he reiterated the Movement's concern at the continued delays in payment of troop costs and contingent-owned equipment leases, which caused hardship to all troop-contributing countries and had an adverse effect on their ability and, potentially, their will to participate in peacekeeping operations.

12. The Movement also found it necessary to again highlight paragraph 148 of the report of the Special Committee, which stated that "all Member States must pay their assessed contributions in full, on time and without conditions" and which reaffirmed "the obligation of Member States under Article 17 of the Charter to bear the expenses of the Organization as apportioned by the General Assembly, bearing in mind the special responsibility of permanent members of the Security Council, as indicated in General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963".

13. Turning to the issue of procurement, he drew attention to General Assembly resolution 51/231; the Movement believed that the United Nations should give priority to developing countries, particularly troop-contributors, when procuring goods and services of equivalent standards and prices. It should also give preference to the offers of troop-contributing countries in procuring goods and services for their own staff, provided that existing standards and prices were met. In order to deter countries from not paying their assessed contributions and to ensure basic fairness, consideration should be given to attaching the lowest priority to Member States with the capacity to pay which did not fulfil their financial obligations to the Organization.

14. With respect to cooperation between the United Nations and regional arrangements or agencies, he stressed the importance that the Movement attached to paragraphs 156 to 166 of the report of the Special Committee and the fact that such cooperation must be conducted in the letter and spirit of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and must take into account existing instruments and mechanisms in each of the regional arrangements or agencies concerned.

15. The Movement was proud to have been represented by its members in almost every operation since 1948 and, in recent years, to have supplied 77 per cent of troops to peacekeeping missions worldwide. It was deeply aware of the risks inherent in peacekeeping operations and expressed its deepest gratitude to the over 1,500 people who had lost their lives in the service of the United Nations; it continued to express its concern at the increased number of violent attacks against United Nations staff and extended its condolences to the families of those who had lost their lives in the service of the international community.

16. **Ms. Grčić Polić** (Croatia) said that the impressive wealth of material contained in the current year's report of the Special Committee was proof of the extraordinary interest that all major institutional players had in the fields of peacekeeping, preventive action, peace-building and post-conflict follow-on activities. Her delegation wished to add its voice to what it hoped would be a consensus of support for the overall process of reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations and other dimensions thereof. The recommendations contained in the report of the Special Committee and the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("Brahimi report") (A/55/305-S/2000/809) constituted a comprehensive whole. Like Mr. Brahimi, her delegation would be hard-pressed to give priority to one area at the expense

of another; rather, reform was an ongoing process, during the gradual implementation of which it was important not to lose sight of the whole.

17. Her delegation was interested in the reform process because, since gaining independence in 1991, it had experienced conflict, aggression, destruction of property and loss of life and had witnessed the even greater conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. It had also hosted various peacekeeping operations, some successful and others less so; even the successful operations had entailed some unintended negative side effects, though the positive effects had countered them. For the past two years, Croatia had graduated to the status of United Nations troop-contributing nation.

18. Although peacekeeping operations in Croatia had had uneven results, Croatia was firmly committed to the United Nations peacekeeping operations because, in an era of globalization, there was no suitable alternative to the United Nations. There was no other organization that could bring universal legitimacy to peacekeeping operations in Member States. In a global village, no other organization could adequately embody the principles of global solidarity and a caring community in times of need. The concept of a caring global community was based on both interests and compassion, and that alliance of contrary elements was paradigmatic for recent trends in international peacekeeping operations and was acquiring greater recognition as a principle of international comity in the grey areas where international law had yet to be codified.

19. Croatia considered that the efforts to reform peacekeeping operations were a way to improve the Organization's capacity to carry out such activities, which did not mean that the process was merely about capacity or resources. Political will was an important factor and, as the process advanced, it would generate another important quality — an educational effect. Thus, the process itself would mainstream Member States' understanding of the necessary political, legal and professional standards for designing the Security Council's mandates, through the planning, analysis, operation, execution and monitoring of peacekeeping operations. Croatia firmly supported the reform process and endorsed the recommendations for reform and improvement in all critical areas, as well as the corresponding need to restructure the Secretariat and provide the necessary financing for staffing needs. Equally critical was the willingness and capacity of the United Nations to deploy missions more rapidly and the availability of high-quality military and civilian personnel for such missions. To follow up the Millennium Summit, the Secretariat should contact Member States as soon as possible to request their respective contributions.

20. A sense of connection, based on both interests and compassion, could contribute to the Organization's success in conflict prevention and solution. That required both equal access and contributions from all those involved. The Millennium Assembly had confirmed that peacekeeping continued to be one of the core activities of the United Nations. The urgency to achieve a new cooperation climate, greater transparency and commitment to obligations had also been recognized. Although Croatia was delighted that some of those recommendations were already being implemented, such changes might have come too late for other States.

21. The previous week, in her address to the seminar on civilian police organized by *Jane's* and the International Peace Academy, the Deputy Secretary-General had summed up the issue by asking what good the United Nations was if it was always late. That question had reminded Croatia of the victims of Srebrenica; those who affirmed that Srebrenica or Rwanda had not been primarily about capacity were right. The current reform process was not merely about technical military or management issues. It was fundamentally about political will, informed rationale and a commitment to act based on congruous interests and shared compassion.

22. **Mr. Mohammad Kamal** (Malaysia) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Malaysia supported the role played by the United Nations in maintaining peace and security. It had demonstrated that support by taking part in more than 16 peacekeeping operations and would continue to do so, insofar as it was able.

23. Peacekeeping operations were no longer restricted to traditional activities, but included more complex tasks, at times in very hostile environments. Because many of the current conflicts were of an inter-State nature, peacekeepers had found themselves in situations where ceasefire agreements were ignored, which had made it difficult for them to perform their

duties. Peacekeepers had frequently been assigned to perform multidisciplinary functions which, at times, were beyond their means and capacity. That situation had seriously affected their performance and image. In some regions, United Nations peacekeepers had been humiliated. It was important to learn from experience in order to avoid the same mistakes, which could further undermine operations.

24. To avoid new tragedies, peacekeeping operations needed to be restructured and modernized. Peacekeepers required better training and equipment, and more support from United Nations Headquarters and Member States. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations was severely understaffed, so that it was urgent to recruit more officials and, when doing so, the principle of equitable geographical distribution should be taken into consideration. It was also important to increase resources, both financing and troops and equipment, for peacekeeping activities in the field.

25. Currently, more than 75 per cent of United Nations peacekeepers came from developing countries and, in most cases, they worked in high-risk regions. The absence of troops from developed countries, above all in Africa, was particularly noticeable. In Malaysia's opinion, given their resources, those countries should participate more actively, so as to improve the credibility and efficiency of operations.

26. With regard to the slow rate of reimbursement of the cost of operations, the situation was aggravated by continued non-payment of peacekeeping contributions by Member States. The practice of borrowing funds destined for peacekeeping activities to finance regular activities was undermining the Organization's ability to reimburse countries that provided troops and equipment.

27. To date, the United Nations owed $20 million to Malaysia. Despite that fact, and its current financial crisis, Malaysia paid its dues on time and without conditions. In that respect, it was unacceptable that some Member States, particularly the largest contributor, failed to fulfil their obligations: the situation should be resolved without delay.

28. **Mr. Shen** Guofang (China) said that current problems relating to peacekeeping involved politics, resources, management and other dimensions and required an integrated and coordinated solution. Parties to conflicts should take concrete action to implement relevant peace agreements and ensure the safety of peacekeepers, and Member States should provide political support and sufficient resources to ensure the success of peacekeeping operations. Coordination must also be enhanced between the Security Council, troop-contributing countries and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and more attention must be paid to the views of the parties to conflicts. Steps should also be taken to ensure that regional organizations and the countries in the region of the conflict played as full a role as possible. In formulating rules of engagement, it was essential that peacekeepers not become parties to any conflict. Given that each situation varied, the rules of engagement should be authorized by the Security Council and tailored to actual conditions on the ground. The United Nations must also give equal treatment to conflicts in all regions of the world; failure to do so would undermine its reputation for impartiality.

29. In order to succeed, peacekeeping and conflict prevention activities must adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and there should be a clearly defined exit time frame. In developing countries in particular, special attention must be paid to eliminating the root causes of conflict and improving economic and social conditions. Operations must be carried out in cooperation with the Government of the country, which should be allowed to play a dominant role in solving the conflict, and ensuring full respect for national laws and culture.

30. In recruiting staff, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should demonstrate more transparency and follow the principles of equitable geographical distribution and balance between developing and developed countries. The Secretariat should also indicate how it planned to rationally utilize the 190 new posts proposed for DPKO.

31. His delegation supported prompt implementation of the practical recommendations contained in the Brahimi report (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations — A/55/305-S/2000/809), including for example ensuring a clear mandate for each mission, facilitating rapid deployment, enhancing information gathering and analysis capacities, strengthening consultations with the troop-contributing countries and reforming DPKO, and was willing to work with other Member States to strengthen the peacekeeping capacity of the United Nations.

32. **Mr. Júnior** (Mozambique) said that much remained to be done to free the world from wars and conflicts, particularly in Africa. An effective and sustainable approach to that problem required a collective effort to address the root causes of conflict, which were of a social and economic nature. The major international financial and economic institutions as well as donor countries must renew their commitment to the eradication of poverty by addressing the issues of external debt, official development assistance, market access and the deterioration of terms of trade.

33. In an effort to bring stability to the continent, African States had continued their efforts to build African capacity for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The first meeting of the African Ministerial Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation on the Continent, held in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 2000, had proposed a plan of action and implementation mechanism for that purpose. Similarly, within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was rethinking the methods to be used in more effectively meeting the objectives of preventive peacekeeping actions.

34. Effective implementation of the recommendations of the Brahimi report required the political will of all Member States as well as the allocation of additional resources. One of the report's major recommendations dealt with the need for the rapid and timely deployment of peacekeeping forces. The problem of double standards when addressing conflicts in different regions of the world, in particular in Africa, must also be addressed.

35. After experiencing the horrors of war, Mozambique currently enjoyed peace and stability. Among collaborative initiatives between the Government and non-governmental and religious organizations aimed at promoting a culture of peace, a project was being undertaken for the purpose of exchanging weapons for tools for productive activities.

36. In order to fulfil its commitment to the promotion of peace and security, his Government had sent a symbolic contingent of military police officers and observers as part of the peacekeeping force in East Timor. It had also decided to conclude a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations on joining the standby arrangement for peacekeeping operations.

37. **Mr. Toeraasen** (Norway) said that his delegation's political platform for its work in the Security Council would include comprehensive peace building, a concept which covered conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict measures.

38. Many current conflicts had complex and interconnected causes rooted in history, ethnic mistrust, unevenly distributed resources, poverty and lack of development or prospects for the future, which were frequently exploited by undemocratic rulers to strengthen their positions by fanning their peoples' fear of their neighbours. Such conflicts could not be resolved by shifting borders or establishing buffer zones guarded by peacekeepers. Involvement by the international community was often required, including preventive programmes to promote development, democratization and human rights. His delegation fully supported the Secretary-General's position that conflict prevention was far better and cheaper than post-conflict reconstruction.

39. In cases where such efforts failed and conflict broke out, any international peace effort must promote progress from the original situation to one of sustainable peace, which often required a long-term development approach.

40. For decades, Norway had taken a comprehensive approach to development and peace-building. It had firmly supported development programmes worldwide and had a long tradition of cooperation with Norwegian and international non-governmental organizations familiar with the situation of a given region, which helped channel funds to sectors of particular importance in preventing a possible conflict. In cooperation with Norwegian non-governmental organizations, his Government had established standby systems of civilian personnel in fields such as institution-building, human rights, democratization, relief work and development; during the past year, those personnel had conducted over 210 missions in 25 countries.

41. In situations where conflict prevention had failed, Norway had been a troop-contributor to peace operations mandated by the United Nations since 1947 and was currently contributing approximately 1,200 troops; most of those operations were led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but others were in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. In addition, one

per cent of its total police force was serving in peace operations.

42. His Government supported most of the recommendations contained in the Brahimi report and the Secretary-General's views on its implementation. In particular, it supported the proposal to establish an Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, which would be an important early warning tool that would strengthen the Organization's conflict prevention capability and assist the Security Council with respect to mandates for future operations. In his delegation's view, that Secretariat should also remain in close contact with humanitarian organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, whose experience should be taken into account in the planning and execution of operations.

43. Experience had shown that an essential prerequisite for post-conflict rebuilding was the establishment of well-functioning police, legal and penal systems. His delegation therefore welcomed the Brahimi report's emphasis on the importance of civilian police and on the need for security sector reform. It also welcomed the decision of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to move the Civilian Police Unit out of the military reporting chain and the Panel's recommendation to upgrade the rank of the Civilian Police Adviser.

44. His Government supported the Panel's recommendation to strengthen the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other parts of the Secretariat involved in the conduct of those operations and the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces to assist the Department in planning and conducting new operations in their initial stages. As a prerequisite for the establishment of rosters of potential peace operation leaders, national rosters should be established by Member States. His delegation also supported the idea of providing training courses for leaders at Headquarters and in the field. In May 2000, Norway had organized a peacekeeping senior management seminar and would continue to provide support for training senior leaders of United Nations missions.

45. Rapid deployment required the establishment of standby civilian and military forces; his delegation endorsed the Brahimi report suggestion that an "on-call list" should be established. For its part, his Government was establishing a standby force of 3,500 soldiers, which would allow it to maintain a force of 1,500 troops in international peacekeeping operations. It would continue to participate in the United Nations Standing High-Readiness Brigade and its contribution to the Standby Arrangements Systems would soon include civilian police and other civilian experts. It would also maintain its assistance to countries that wished to strengthen their capacity to participate in peace operations, focusing on southern Africa through its training of trainers programme, Training for Peace in Southern Africa.

46. In order to ensure the credibility of future United Nations peace operations, it was essential for the Organization not to initiate operations where the possibility of failure was unacceptably high. He welcomed the initiative of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to close the gap between mandates and resources. To that end, ways must be found to involve potential troop-contributing countries more closely in the Security Council's work of mandating peace operations.

47. It was essential for the mandates, rules of engagement and forces of future peacekeeping operations to be robust enough to adequately protect personnel; however, the Secretary-General had rightly emphasized the need to ensure that the United Nations did not become a war machine.

48. In order for the United Nations to fulfil its responsibility for peace-building, it was essential for all Member States to pay their contributions on time, in full and without conditions.

Mr. Holkeri (Finland) took the Chair.

49. **Mr. Levitte** (France), speaking on behalf of the European Union and the associated countries Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, said that he welcomed the Brahimi report and that the General Assembly should adopt urgent measures to implement the recommendations contained therein, particularly by providing the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with the staff and resources necessary to the fulfilment of its mandate.

50. The maintenance of international peace and security required resolute action by all those concerned: the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the General Assembly and all Member States.

Reform of the system should therefore be a collective task in which all stakeholders participated.

51. The European Union supported efforts to coordinate and promote continuity in peace efforts before, during and after peacekeeping operations, and wished to make an active and effective contribution to conflict prevention and settlement. It would continue to cooperate with the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Council and other international organizations to promote stability, early warning, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, while bearing in mind that the United Nations had the leading role in preserving world peace and security. In June 2000 in Santa María da Feira, the European Council had reaffirmed its decision to elaborate a common security and defence policy which could strengthen the European Union's external activities, creating a capacity for management of crises, both military and civilian, fully in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

52. The European Union's commitment to peacekeeping was reflected in its contributions of troops, civilian police and military observers to United Nations operations. Its member States had undertaken to contribute 5,000 civilian police for peacekeeping by the year 2003; in relation to rapid deployment, it had also adopted the goal of being able to deploy 1,000 civilian police in less than 30 days. The European Union contributed close to 40 per cent of the United Nations peacekeeping budget.

53. It was unacceptable that certain countries did not pay their contributions owed to the Organization. That attitude contravened the principle of the collective responsibility of Member States, particularly for peacekeeping, because it was particularly harmful to troop-contributing countries, which had to wait for their costs to be reimbursed. Member States should honour the obligations they had undertaken pursuant to the Charter and pay their contributions fully and without delay.

54. A number of reforms were needed in peacekeeping practices and procedures in order to alleviate the deficiencies of the current system in the preparation, planning and rapid deployment and implementation of operations. In the light of the Brahimi report, the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and recent experience, the European Union considered that it should be a matter of priority, firstly, for the Security Council to establish clear, convincing and viable mandates for peacekeeping operations, a goal which entailed strengthening consultations with troop-contributing countries. In addition, the rules of engagement should be adapted to the context and mandate of each mission. Rapid deployment of peacekeeping operations was also essential. That would require, inter alia: coordinated action by the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the troop-contributing countries and the General Assembly; improvements in logistical services, civilian policing and the Office of the Military Adviser; formulation of an overall logistical support strategy; and reform of procedures for procurement and management of expenditure. The strengthening of standby forces would also permit more rapid and effective planning of new missions.

55. The United Nations needed staff and troops which were well-trained and equipped. Units which did not meet the minimal requirements established in the relevant memorandum of understanding could not be deployed. In that context, the European Union supported the strengthening of the peacekeeping capacities of African countries and intended to contribute to that effort.

56. Improvements in the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations also required changes in Secretariat structures to permit improved coordination of mission planning and management; improvements in data collection mechanisms in order to enhance the Secretariat's strategic analysis; integration of programmes of humanitarian aid, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and measures to ensure respect for human rights and gender equality; and the use of information technology for improved coordination among the various United Nations bodies and departments.

57. The lessons learned from past experience should be put to use, and the only instrument available to the United Nations for ensuring peace should be strengthened. To that end, greater financial resources were needed. Not only would that not be detrimental to other, equally important areas such as development; on the contrary, it would also be beneficial to them, since efforts to preserve peace would help to promote development.

58. **Mr. Kumalo** (South Africa) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

59. He welcomed the fact that, during the Millennium Summit, Member States had committed themselves to eradicating the scourge of war. Unfortunately, particularly in Africa, the United Nations had often failed to execute its tasks in that respect in an effective, rapid, well-planned and well-coordinated manner.

60. South Africa had called for peacekeeping operations to take account of the increased demand for United Nations interventions and the growing complexity of conflicts. There was also a need for a comprehensive approach based on long-term strategies to support and consolidate peace. His delegation welcomed the Brahimi report and agreed with the argument made in that report that the maintenance of peace and security entailed three activities: conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building.

61. Costly peacekeeping operations were no substitute for activities to address the root causes of conflicts. As President Mbeki had stated the previous year in the General Assembly, South Africa believed that the United Nations had a supreme responsibility for preventing conflicts. That required political will, institutional resources and regional agreements. His delegation eagerly awaited the report on conflict prevention to be submitted by the Secretary-General, and wished to contribute to ensuring a greater focus on prevention.

62. Where conflict prevention failed, intervention would be necessary, based on the recommendations contained in the Brahimi report. Clear and credible mandates must be defined through consultations between the Security Council and troop contributors, especially with regard to the use of force. There must also be a coordinated approach to mission planning and he took note of the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel aimed at enhancing planning capacity through the establishment of an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat attached to the Executive Committee on Peace and Security as well as the establishment of integrated mission task forces. Noting the concerns of some Member States with regard to the latter, he proposed a dialogue between Member States and the Secretariat with a view to reaching agreement. Rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces was also necessary. While the standby arrangements system must be expanded, its shortcomings must first be addressed. Developing countries should also be provided with assistance in meeting training and logistical requirements for participation in peacekeeping operations and further consideration should be given to the question of strategic lift support for contingents, an issue raised by the Secretary-General in his report on the implementation of the Brahimi report (A/55/502). Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations must also be strengthened through the restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, bearing in mind the principles of equitable geographic representation and gender balance. With regard to the latter, he welcomed the recommendation of the Secretary-General to establish a gender unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

63. In order to succeed in the third phase of peace operations, peace-building, a plan must be formulated to develop the Organization's permanent capacity for peace-building, in particular in the fields of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. The Brahimi report also raised a number of other important issues which required in-depth review.

64. **Mr. Zaki** (Egypt) associated his delegation with the statement made by Jordan on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, but wished to make a few observations on the strengthening of United Nations peacekeeping mechanisms.

65. A review of the successes and failures of the past should be undertaken, based on the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel aimed at strengthening military operations and humanitarian assistance. Mandates and objectives should be clearly defined through a consultative process between the Security Council and Member States and an integrated approach should be adopted on the basis of full strategic, military and political analysis.

66. The developed countries and the great Powers should not limit themselves to providing verbal support for peacekeeping operations but must show greater political commitment and make concrete contributions on the ground. Peacekeeping was a collective responsibility of the international community and consultation mechanisms must therefore be improved, in particular between the Security Council and troop

contributors, so that the latter could play a role in the decision-making process. The Security Council must understand that States which risked the lives of their citizens had the right to fully understand the mandate and the situation on the ground.

67. The financial deficit must also be eliminated; it reduced the number of contingents, which increased risks and the likelihood that operations would fail. The Secretary-General had made ambitious proposals for reform of the Secretariat which would be viable only if all States paid their assessments in full, on time and without conditions. Developing troop-contributing countries should be reimbursed as quickly as possible, to which end the Secretariat's working methods must be reformed.

68. In reviewing current United Nations interventions, one innovation stood out: missions for the establishment of transitional civil administrations. Such missions, which represented a major change in the basic philosophy of peacekeeping activities, raised important issues which must be resolved before the Brahimi report recommendations could be implemented. His delegation believed that operations such as the United Nations transitional civil administrations in Kosovo and East Timor were not justified; that issue must be reviewed in depth.

69. **Mr. Picasso** (Peru) associated his delegation with the statement made by Jordan on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and said that the past year had been a time of intense reflection on peacekeeping operations within the Organization in different forums and instances, as a result not only of the increasing complexity of conflicts but also of the scope of the new peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council.

70. Within that debate, attention had repeatedly been drawn to the fact that the members of the Security Council, in particular the permanent members, had unilaterally expanded the content, scope and mandate of United Nations peacekeeping operations, in most cases leaving other States and the General Assembly passive observers. That issue had been examined in depth at informal meetings of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the competent body for reviewing all such operations within the United Nations system. The Committee had emphasized the need to empower it so that it could fully perform the task for which it had been created, become a valid interlocutor and reinforce its current capacity for influencing decisions; it had also stressed that it was the only forum on peacekeeping operations to which many States had access and within which they could discuss the various points of view on such operations.

71. Within the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Peru had taken part in various discussions on the nature of peacekeeping operations, which had acknowledged the evolution of the concept. Peace-building efforts appeared to be fundamental and complementary to action that should not threaten either State sovereignty or the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States. That approach was necessary because of the nature of internal conflicts, which must be tackled by specific efforts aimed at building peace, establishing a minimum organizational capacity able to maintain itself over time, and giving the society in question viability, opportunities and a future, while confronting the real causes of the conflict. However, decisions on such issues were not the sole prerogative of the Security Council and should therefore be taken by other more representative organs of the Organization. A further conclusion of those discussions, which coincided with the findings of the Special Committee, was that it was not possible to design a single a priori arrangement for all peacekeeping operations; mandates and resources had to vary, in a case-by-case approach. Consequently, it was important to have fundamental principles and standards that served as a basis for operations, such as the established principles of consent, neutrality and the use of force only in self-defence.

72. In that evolution, Peru also observed that, as the Special Committee had indicated, concern for the protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations, should they be attacked in the mission's area of operation, had incorporated the experience acquired in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Moreover, at the most recent meeting of the Special Committee, the importance of providing Member States with timely and updated information on all aspects of peacekeeping operations and the need for a comprehensive safety plan to protect the lives of personnel working with the operations had been stressed.

73. Peru had participated in the intense debate on the Brahimi report that had been taking place both within and outside the Organization and agreed with most of its practical recommendations. The debate had helped to create a favourable environment for strengthening

those operations and the administrative structure in areas conducive to the fulfilment of their mandate. The political momentum should not be lost. Peru particularly emphasized the measures to increase coordination and consultation between the Security Council and troop-contributing countries in the formulation and discussion of the mandate of specific operations, which should be started in the initial stages of the operation and be institutionalized by a subsidiary body. In the same way, Peru supported the recommendation that those countries should take part in the information meetings on the protection of United Nations staff or on a new interpretation of the mandate on the use of force, organized by the secretariat of the Security Council.

74. The participation of troop contributors was both a coherent, practical measure and a fair acknowledgement of the States that executed the most difficult and risky phase of peacekeeping operations, whose voices should be heard with regard to the theory and practice of missions, particularly because 77 per cent of troops were from developing countries. Peru also supported the recommendations to provide troop contributors with full explanation of the benefits, objectives and mandates of each operation.

75. Peru also supported all measures designed to strengthen peacekeeping operations that reinforced the work of the Organization in that area. In that respect, Peru agreed with the Special Committee on the need to create conditions for rapid deployment of missions, to strengthen the Secretariat's capacity to plan new missions, and also to improve the coordination and transmission of information between missions in the field and the relevant units at Headquarters, with better use of communications technology and more training for the staff participating in operations.

76. However, Peru also noted that some of the proposed recommendations were based on an extrapolation of extreme and complex peacekeeping operations, such as those in Kosovo and East Timor — which it hoped were exceptional — into general standards, applicable to all. That type of mission, which involved the almost total reconstruction of a society, should not be the basic pattern for the preparation and planning to strengthen the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. That would involve preparing the Organization for responsibilities which, in many cases, were beyond its capacities, assigning very large amounts of resources and personnel, at the expense of other specific areas that would not receive the same attention, such as poverty relief and development efforts. In any case, when exceptionally that might be necessary, such responsibilities and capacities should first be discussed and developed through a process of consultation with the General Assembly, the most democratic body of the Organization, so that agreed positions could be reached.

77. At the same time, Peru was concerned about some aspects of the Organization's preventive measures, which might leave open the possibility of the violation of some core principles of the Charter, such as non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the principle of non-intervention.

78. The Brahimi report had indicated that its task was not to establish the reasons for which the Organization should become involved in a specific conflict; however, it provided some guidelines that would give extensive powers to the Security Council to take preventive measures, endorsing the recommendations of the Secretary-General, both in his Millennium report and in his second participation before the Security Council on the issue. During the latter, the Secretary-General had presented a broad vision of the causes of conflicts that required preventive measures. They included not only situations of an economic and social nature, but also those with greater political content such as the anti-democratic activities of a Government, the overall distribution of power and human rights violations. Peru did not agree with that conception, because its interpretation led necessarily to ethnocentric and arbitrary judgements.

79. Peru understood that the prevention of conflicts must necessarily be based on the participation of the State concerned and its full consent, and should be carried out in support of State actions to establish the proper means for shaping a rule of law that was extensive, generous, suited to domestic realities and included processes involving the entire population. Such consent should also be required when the Security Council sought to carry out a fact-finding mission.

80. With regard to the financing of the recommendations proposed by the Secretary-General in his report (A/55/507), Peru considered that they should be studied further by the appropriate bodies in view of the amount of resources required. The discussion should not lose sight of the effects that such activities

could have on the burden of payments falling on each country.

81. Peru was following and would continue to follow with interest the current reflection on and strengthening of peacekeeping operations of the Organization, especially since after ten years of non-participation his country had resumed participation in the past year by sending military observers and contingents to United Nations missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia and East Timor.

82. Peru believed that the conceptual and practical approach to peacekeeping operations should be based on precise and agreed principles arising from a process of negotiation and exchange of ideas that would prevent the imposition of concepts detrimental to the feelings of the majority of States. Such general principles would include unrestricted respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence in matters within the internal jurisdiction of the host State, as well as the consent of the host State with regard to both the peacekeeping operation and any preventive measures, the neutrality of the contingents in the mission and the use of force only in cases of self-defence.

83. **Mr. Musambachime** (Zambia) associated his delegation with the statement made by the representative of Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. He also wished to place on record his delegation's gratitude to the Secretary-General for having convened the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and to the Panel for its report, which would contribute greatly to improving operations in the field of peace and security. The Secretary-General's report on the implementation of the Panel's report had allayed most of the fears his delegation had felt in its initial study of the Panel's recommendations.

84. More than half of the recommendations in the Panel's report had been made earlier by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, although, for reasons unknown to his delegation, those recommendations had not been implemented. It was to be hoped that the Security Council and the Secretariat would now act on them.

85. For a long time members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had been calling for closer consultations between the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries. Zambia hoped that the Council would carry out its intention to strengthen such consultations as affirmed in its resolution 1318 (2000), as that was the only way of avoiding a repetition of what had happened in Sierra Leone, where some Member States had withdrawn their troops because they could not agree with the new concept of operations and the tasks being given to the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

86. Although the Brahimi report stated that the five permanent members of the Security Council currently contributed far fewer troops to United Nations-led operations but that four of the five had contributed sizeable forces to the operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo (A/55/305, para. 104), not only was no indication given of how to redress the situation but the report blamed the developing countries, accusing them of sending ill-trained and ill-equipped troops. Those accusations were, for the most part, unfair and uncalled for, since in most cases countries signed a memorandum of understanding with the Secretariat before sending troops to a peacekeeping mission.

87. The Western countries were not prepared to risk their troops in areas where they had no interests. That task was being left mostly to developing countries, which were being, on the one hand, blamed for the poor training and equipment of their troops and, on the other hand, told to reduce their defence spending and the size of their military forces.

88. The situation of developing countries was exacerbated by the non-payment of monies owed them for their participation in peacekeeping operations. The question of reimbursement should be settled before it adversely affected the capacity and will of developing countries to participate in peacekeeping operations; it was therefore disappointing that the question had not been the subject of a recommendation in the Brahimi report.

89. Zambia continued to be concerned by the imbalance in the distribution of Professional posts in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Over 50 per cent of the Department's staff came from two regions of the world, whereas most of the developing countries, which were the regular troop providers, were not represented at all. Most of the 181 posts proposed for the Department would go to developed countries, despite the fact that the Panel presided over by Mr. Brahimi had made no such recommendation. His

delegation felt that the question of the under-representation of the developing countries would have to be corrected through measures similar to those taken to correct the under-representation of women in the Secretariat and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

90. Although the report contained many positive elements that Zambia supported, it failed to address the problems that he had mentioned. Solving those problems would, in the view of his delegation, encourage more developing countries to participate in peacekeeping operations.

91. **Mr. Kobayashi** (Japan) welcomed the initiative of the Secretary-General in commissioning the Brahimi report and noted that the number of personnel serving in peacekeeping missions had increased from slightly more than 10,000 the previous year to nearly 40,000 currently. More importantly, many recent operations had been organized in response to intra-State conflicts, with the result that their mandates often included humanitarian assistance, peace-building and civilian administration. The increasing diversity of peacekeeping operations, in addition to the rapid growth in the number of personnel involved, posed new challenges for Member States, the Security Council and the Secretariat.

92. The Brahimi report presented a number of ideas to meet those challenges. He strongly supported, for example, the more frequent use of fact-finding missions by the Secretary-General, improvement of the working methods of the Security Council, strengthening of rapid deployment capabilities with regard to mission leadership, military personnel, civilian police and civilian specialists and the creation of integrated mission task forces, as well as other measures to strengthen the capabilities of the Secretariat. He also supported the introduction of a merit-based system in both the Secretariat and the field missions and the need to respect local norms and cultures.

93. With regard to the request for additional resources, however, he stressed the need to focus only on requirements of great urgency which could not be met by redeployment of existing resources.

94. One important issue not addressed in the Brahimi report was the safety of United Nations personnel. The Secretary-General's recent report on the safety of United Nations personnel addressed only the safety of civilians but it was equally important to ensure the safety of peacekeepers and he urged the Secretariat to initiate a general and comprehensive review of security requirements as recommended repeatedly by the Special Committee. Japan was prepared to cooperate in that endeavour and, in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, would host an international seminar on that topic in March 2001.

95. **Mr. Widodo** (Indonesia) associated his delegation with the statement made by the representative of Jordan on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

96. The Brahimi report had introduced the concept of peace operations, which could have serious implications at both the conceptual and practical levels. Peace operations were defined as having three principal activities: conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building. In any given situation the three might be equally critical, as for example in Kosovo or East Timor, while in other situations one activity might predominate, for example in Eritrea and Ethiopia, where military factors were pre-eminent. The report offered practical recommendations dealing with the three categories of activity and further analysis would identify which recommendations were the most suitable for each given situation.

97. He reiterated his delegation's position with regard to certain issues relating to peacekeeping operations not discussed in detail in the Brahimi report, for example, international cooperation between the United Nations and Member States, especially in the field of training and national institutional capacity-building. In that context, he commended the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training Unit and welcomed its contribution to the formulation of guidelines for Indonesia's participation in peacekeeping operations.

98. He also noted that cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in dealing with conflicts in specific regions was both feasible and fruitful, as shown by cooperative efforts with the Organization of American States (OAS) in Haiti, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in various African countries and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the Balkans.

99. Turning to the issue of possible transmission of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases during peacekeeping operations, he supported the Special

Committee's recommendation that information on that problem be incorporated into the "Guidelines for Military and CIVPOL Participation in Peacekeeping Operations" manuals (A/54/839, para. 128). Preventive pre-deployment measures, such as vaccination, should also be instituted in order to mitigate the risk of transmission and a medical unit should be included in any mission in an at-risk country in order to ensure regular medical check-ups; in addition, in cooperation with the host country, high-risk areas should be identified before deployment, in order to facilitate preparation of a prevention strategy.

100. His delegation also agreed with the Special Committee regarding the increasing need for the participation of female personnel, on a broad geographical basis, in all aspects of peacekeeping operations (A/54/839, para. 78) and supported the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.